mineral ownership

Utah Supreme Court Invalidates Tax Title as to Severed Minerals on Due Process Grounds

Oil and Gas Cases, , , , , , , ,

Can Utah’s four-year statute of limitations for challenging a tax sale prevent a property owner who never received notice of the sale from contesting it?  In prior years, the answer may have been “yes.”  In Jordan v. Jensen, 2017 UT 1, 2017 WL 104642, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the answer is an unequivocal “no.”

In Jordan, the owners of the surface and mineral estates conveyed the surface and reserved the minerals in a deed recorded in early 1995, prior to levy and assessment of the property taxes by Uintah County.  The new surface owner failed to fully pay the property taxes levied by the County for 1995, and as a result, the County sold the property at a tax sale in 2000, without notifying the mineral interest owners.  Id. ¶¶ 4-6.  Years later, an oil and gas company seeking to develop the mineral estate obtained a title opinion that indicated that there was a question whether the severed minerals passed at the tax sale because the tax deed did not contain any language reserving the mineral interest.  The mineral interest owners unsuccessfully tried to obtain a quitclaim deed from the surface owners and eventually sued to quiet title to the minerals.  Id. ¶¶ 9-10.

The surface owners argued, among other things, that the County’s general property tax assessment included the nonproducing mineral estate and that the failure to give notice to the mineral owners did not void the tax deed as to the mineral interest because Utah has a four-year statute of limitations that bars challenges to a tax deed.  See id. ¶¶ 13-14.  (Under Utah law, the authority to tax minerals has been delegated exclusively to the Utah State Tax Commission.  The surface owners argued that his delegation was limited to producing minerals and that the counties had the authority to tax the nonproducing minerals).  The district court rejected the surface owners’ arguments and entered summary judgment in favor of the mineral owners.  The surface owners appealed.  Id. ¶ 11.

In its decision in Jordan, the Utah Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether a county has the authority to assess the nonproducing mineral interest, instead limiting its holding to the due process issue.  Id. ¶ 12.

Specifically, the court analyzed whether the four-year statute of limitations provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206 prevented a challenge to the tax title even though the mineral owners never received notice of the County’s tax sale as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Jordan, 2017 UT 1, ¶ 16.  In Hansen v. Morris, 283 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955), the Utah Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a tax sale based on the predecessor to section 206.  The court in Hansen stated that “a failure to provide notice or a due process violation does not prevent section 206 from applying to ‘validate tax titles.’”  Jordan, 2017 UT 1, ¶ 22 (quoting Hansen, 283 P.2d at 885).

In overturning Hansen, the Jordan court noted that subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases have taken a different approach, finding that a statute of limitations “will not apply when it is triggered by constitutionally defective state action.”  Id. ¶ 23 (citing Schroeder v. City of N.Y., 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988)).  Applying these cases, the Jordan court held that section 206 requires state action—the conducting of a tax sale—before it takes effect, and that section 206 will not prevent a party from challenging a tax sale if constitutionally adequate notice is not provided to that party.  Id. ¶ 34.  The court also noted that constructive notice by recording a tax title is insufficient where the mineral owners’ names and addresses are “reasonably ascertainable and known to the county,” as was the case here.  Id. ¶ 38; see id. ¶ 37.  Rather, notice to such owners must be mailed to their last known address of record or otherwise given in a manner that ensures its delivery.  Id. ¶ 37.

The court concluded that because the mineral owners did not receive constitutionally adequate notice, the County did not have jurisdiction over the mineral interest, thus voiding the tax title to the extent it purported to convey the mineral interest.  Id. ¶ 42.  In doing so, the court overruled Hansen “[t]o the extent [it] states that section 206 can apply where a state or county fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice to an interested party of a tax sale….”  Id. ¶ 40.

(Re-printed from Andrew J. LeMieux, Utah Oil & Gas, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, Volume XXXIV, Number 1, 2017)

Utah Oil & Gas Update

Oil and Gas Regulations, Royalty Issues, Title Issues/Curative, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIES THE OPEN MINES DOCTRINE, REJECTS PETITION TO CONSTRUE WILL IN FAVOR OF LIFE TENANTS

In re Estate of Womack, 2016 UT App 83, 2016 WL 1729528, involved a decedent whose formally probated Will devised a 160-acre parcel to his three children, in equal shares. See id. ¶ 2. In his Will, the decedent specified that “the oil, gas and mineral rights under the said property . . . are devised to each of my children, share and share alike, for life,” remainder to the decedent’s grandchildren. Id. In 1990, the district court entered an estate closing order that named the decedent’s three children as the owners of the 160-acre parcel outright. Id. ¶ 3. In 1992, the district court amended the estate closing order “to conform to the Will” and provide for the grandchildren’s remainder in the minerals, which had been incorrectly omitted in the prior order. Id. ¶ 4. In 2008, an oil and gas company leased the minerals underlying the 160-acre parcel, but a question arose as to who was entitled to the proceeds of production. Id. ¶ 5.

In an effort to clarify who was entitled to the proceeds of production, one of the life tenants petitioned the district court to reopen the decedent’s estate and construe the Will in favor of the life tenants. According to the life tenant, the prior order’s lack of specificity resulted in an ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the life tenants, based on an affidavit from the drafting attorney regarding the decedent’s intent. Id. ¶¶ 5 and 6. Two of the remaindermen challenged the petition, asserting that the requested relief would require the court to re-construe a provision of the Will that had already been construed, and that the court would be required to vacate or modify its prior order. This, the remaindermen contended, was barred by a six-month statute of limitations. Id. ¶ 14 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-412). The district court agreed with the remaindermen and denied the life tenant’s petition to construe the Will.

The life tenant appealed, claiming that the district court had misinterpreted the nature of the petition, and that the petition only sought clarification of the prior estate closing order, which was not subject to the six-month limitations period. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court cited the open mines doctrine and concluded that the remaindermen were entitled to the proceeds of production because the Will did not specify otherwise. The Court found that the prior estate closing order had already construed the Will as creating life estates in mineral rights, and “[l]ife estates in mineral rights, by default, do not encompass a right to any proceeds from new mineral extraction.” Id. ¶ 17 (citing Hynson v. Jeffries, 697 So.2d 792, 797 (Miss. Ct. App. 1997). In the Court’s view, the Will was not ambiguous, and clarification was not necessary. Id. The Court found that the prior estate closing order “implicitly granted extraction proceeds to the [remaindermen] (albeit by default).” Id. ¶ 19. Because the petition sought to prove the decedent’s intent for the life tenants to receive income from the minerals, “rather than letting such proceeds default to the holders of the remainder” under common law, the Court found that the six-month time limit for vacations and modifications of prior orders applied, and the petition was time-barred. Id.

UTAH LEGISLATURE CONFIRMS THAT FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL INTERESTS MUST BE EXCLUDED WHEN CALCULATING SEVERANCE TAX ON OIL AND GAS

In the May 2015 edition of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, we reported on the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2015 UT 25, 345 P.3d 648 (Utah 2015). In Anadarko, the Court held that an oil and gas operator may exclude federal, state, and tribal interests when calculating its severance tax rate.

The Utah legislature recently codified the rule established by Anadarko. See S.B. 17, ch. 324, 2016 Utah Laws (amending Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-102 and 59-5-103.1). S.B. 17 confirms that the severance tax on oil and gas does not apply to federal, state, or tribal interests in oil and gas. As such, for purposes of determining the amount of severance tax, these exempt interests should be excluded when calculating the value of oil and gas and the tax rate. S.B. 17 applies to a taxable year beginning on or after January 1, 2015, as well as to severance taxes “for any taxable year, including a taxable year beginning before January 1, 2015, that is the subject of an appeal that was filed or pending on or after January 1, 2016.” Id.

(Re-printed from Andrew J. LeMieux, Utah Oil & Gas, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Mineral Law Newsletter, May 2016)

Utilizing Online Resources to Save Time: A Primer for Landmen and Title Examiners

Due Diligence, Title Issues/Curative, , , , , , , ,

Advances in technology save everyone time. We all look to technology to organize and inform our daily lives in both professional and personal settings. How can technology be used to save time when dealing with common title issues? Something as simple as knowing where to obtain a patent or how to determine potential heirs can save a landman time and avoid unnecessary questions and research.

There is a vast amount of title information available online, but knowing where to find it is half the battle. This article provides a brief summary of some of the best online resources available to landmen. These websites1 provide materials ranging from oil and gas plats to well production records, which can be used to form a more complete and accurate picture of the land and title issues being examined.

Because most land ownership in the Western United States originated with the federal government, a good place to start is with the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) website2, regardless of the current ownership of the land. The BLM website provides land patents, surveys, master title and oil and gas plats, and historical indices for a select group of states:

  • Official BLM Patents are particularly useful to confirm federal reservations.
  • Survey plats can be used to track changes in legal descriptions.
  • Plats provide a visual representation and depict the current uses on those lands in a given township and range.
  • Historical indices provide a ledger-like record of all uses that have occurred in a given township and range.

However, land status records for a few of the Western states are maintained separately on the respective BLM state office’s website.3 See the BLM website for more information regarding the availability of these records.

In addition, geographic reports with accompanying serial register pages are available through the Bureau of Land Management Land & Mineral Legacy Rehost 2000 System (“LR-2000”) website4. These reports can be obtained by searching lands by township, range, and section. Geographic reports provide a list of all uses, including mining claims, federal leases, right-of-ways, and communitization agreements for a designated geographic area and will provide the BLM internal serial number for each use. Once you have the serial number, an accompanying serial register page which is available for both inactive and active uses provides more detailed information pertaining to each use.

The next source of valuable information is the state entity tasked with regulating oil and gas. Various oil and gas records can be found on state oil and gas commission websites:

Unfortunately, most states have unique websites that require a little patience to navigate. Also, some states do not provide older production records online. Although it is easier to search in some states than others, most states also provide spacing and pooling orders. These records are helpful to find detailed information on a well or to determine whether a lease has been properly held by production.

Individual county resources available online can vary greatly. Fortunately, more and more counties are providing online parcel viewers, often with aerial maps, which can be used to give a visual representation of the land, surface parcel boundaries, parcel acreage, roads, railroads, utilities, and bodies of water. Most county websites at least provide the status of property taxes which can help confirm surface ownership, while other counties provide additional resources through a paid subscription service.

You may also need to research corporate status or history of an entity. Every state has an entity that regulates the corporations registered in the state5 with a range of information that can be obtained regarding a business entity including (but not limited to) officers, addresses, and formation dates. One type of data that is typically available from these Secretary of State sites, but often requires a fee, is the corporate succession. However, there are other online resources that are free and easier to use. For example, the BLM Wyoming website offers the Corporate Name Change & Mergers Index6 and the National Association of Division Order Analysts maintains a mergers and acquisitions database as well.7 In the event a landman is faced with a gap in title between two entities, these resources particularly helpful to confirm whether an entity has merged or changed its name.

In addition to government sponsored websites, there are also some private sites that can be useful, especially in the area of genealogy. Genealogical research may be required for various title curative issues that may arise, including determining potential heirs, or confirming the death of a join tenant. There are many helpful resources online to troubleshoot these issues, including GenealogyBank.com8, a subscription-based service with a database of 6,500 newspapers which can aide in the search for an obituary or death notice. In addition, Ancestry.com9 can be used for a more intense, subscription-based genealogical search for census records, birth and death certificates, and other historical documents like military and marriage records.

These easy to access records can save time and money when dealing with basic title issues that arise at the outset of many, often time-sensitive, title projects.

1Many of these online resources limit their liability regarding the accuracy of the information provided.
2https://www.glorecords.blm.gov/default.aspx.
3For example, Nevada and Wyoming.
4http://www.blm.gov/lr2000.
5Colorado, Delaware, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah, Wyoming.
6 http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/resources/public_room/corporate_list.html.
7http://www.nadoa.org/forms/ma/From_To_Updated_2014.pdf.
8http://www.genealogybank.com/.
9http://www.ancestry.com/.

But My Husband (or Wife) Doesn’t Need to Sign: Spousal Joinder Issues

Royalty Issues, , , , , ,

When obtaining an oil and gas lease from an individual mineral owner, it is a common practice for landmen to obtain a signature on the lease not only from the record title owner but also from that person’s spouse. That is done for good reason. Given the various legal principles that may require spousal joinder – such as community property rights and homestead laws as discussed in this article – obtaining spousal joinder on a lease often is required, and is a very good precaution even in situations where it may not be required.1

Obviously, a lease isn’t the only place where spousal joinder issues crop up. The chain of title to mineral property may include a number of deeds that were executed by individuals who held record title at the time and that were not executed by the spouses, if any, of such persons. Often there is nothing in the abstract confirming whether or not the grantor was married at the time a deed was executed. When it comes to conveyances that were executed in the past, a landman doesn’t readily have the ability to cause the grantor’s spouse to execute the deed and thereby eliminate the risk that a required spousal joinder was not obtained. So when is joinder in a conveyance by the non-record title owning spouse required?

For land in a community property state, any conveyance by a married individual without joinder of that person’s spouse raises the issue of whether any potential community property interest of a non-record title owner spouse was conveyed, or even whether the conveyance by the spouse owning record title was valid. Of the western states, Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon and Washington are community property states. Statutes in several of those states specifically require joinder of a husband and wife in execution of a conveyance of community property.2 Generally speaking, when a married individual living in a community property state acquires mineral rights or other real property interests in that state using funds generated by the joint effort of both spouses, the property is community property. Both spouses have an equal, presently vested interest in such real property. On the other hand, real property interests acquired by either spouse before marriage or after entry of decree of dissolution of marriage, and real property acquired by either spouse by gift, bequest, devise or descent, is separate property. The issue of what constitutes community property or quasi-community property is state specific and fact specific and is beyond the scope of this article.

Community property issues can’t be ignored entirely with respect to real property in common law jurisdictions either. A number of western states, including Colorado,3 Montana,4 Utah5 and Wyoming,6 have adopted the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act. Under these statutes, the community property rights of a surviving spouse that resided in a community property state are recognized as to real property located in the applicable common law state. If both spouses are living, these statutes are not a concern. However, execution by a non-record title owing spouse is needed when conveying real property in the common law state that was owned by a deceased resident of a community property state, except as to real property that is separate property under the laws of the community property state.7 The statutes do protect purchasers for value from a personal representative, heir or devisee of the record title holder that has apparent title to the property against claims of the surviving spouse.

Other spousal joinder requirements arise out of state laws requiring that both spouses must join in instruments affecting real property when the land is a homestead. In Montana,8 Nevada,9 South Dakota10 and Utah,11 homesteads are created by a filing or a declaration in accordance with the applicable state statute, and spousal joinder is required to convey or encumber homesteads of married persons so created.12 In other states such as Nebraska,13 New Mexico,14 North Dakota,15 and Wyoming,16 a homestead right can arise without the filing of a homestead certificate. In Colorado, homesteads created automatically under the statutory provisions can be conveyed or encumbered free and clear of homestead rights by the record owner alone, but if the owner and spouse file a homestead declaration, the signature of both spouses is required to convey or encumber the property.17

In states where a homestead filing is required, if the title data is sufficient to determine that there was no homestead filing, a landman or title examiner can conclude that no spousal joinder was required in a conveyance. In jurisdictions where a homestead can be created without filing, spousal joinder generally should be obtained due to the difficulty of determining whether the land falls within the statutory definition of a homestead such that spousal joinder is required.18 However, given the provisions of the various homestead statutes, an out of state owner or the owner of a severed mineral interest would not be in a position to assert a homestead claim. As a result, the lack of joinder by the spouse of the record owner on a deed conveying such an interest would not be a title defect unless spousal joinder was needed for reasons other than the homestead statute.

In addition to the statutes discussed above, most states have adopted probate laws which guarantee that a surviving spouse will receive a fraction of the total value of the spouse’s estate. These statutes also permit the surviving spouse to attack certain conveyances made prior to death if the reduced estate and other assets are not there to satisfy the survivor’s share. The most common form of forced share provision is the augmented estate provision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC). In order to protect the surviving spouse against transfers made before death, the effect of which is to reduce the estate and therefore the statutory guaranteed share, the UPC allows augmenting the estate to include certain property dispositions made by the decedent alone during a specified period (usually two years) before death. The augmented estate provisions of the UPC have been adopted in various forms in Colorado,19 Montana,20 Nebraska,21 North Dakota22 and Utah.23 These statutes are relevant only as to conveyances that were made by a married record owner without spousal joinder during the specified period before his or her death, when the issue has not been rendered moot by subsequent probate or intestacy proceedings which clarify that the surviving spouse did not elect to take under the augmented estate provisions.

As the discussion above indicates, there is no simple, across-the-board answer to the question of when spousal joinder is required in a conveyance. Whether the lack of spousal joinder in a deed in the chain of title resulted in an outstanding interest that was not conveyed may depend on facts not available in an abstract examined. Clearly one needs to understand the statutes and case law of the applicable state as the starting point in making that determination.

1If an individual executes a lease alone, the lessee frequently includes a recital stating the reason given by the lessor as to why joinder by a spouse was not needed. For example, the lease may recite that the lessor is a single person, or is a widow or widower. When the spouse of a record owner who is married does not sign a lease, the lease may recite that the lessor is dealing with his or her separate property. Inclusion of self-serving recitals such as these may make a company more comfortable in accepting a lease that has not been executed by the record owner’s spouse, but there is a risk in relying on such recitals without further confirmation since they are not proof of the facts stated. The “facts” recited may be incorrect. At most, they qualify the recited facts as prima facie evidence or create a rebuttable presumption that they are true. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-35-107 (recitals instruments recorded for 20 years are prima facie evidence of facts recited therein); S.D. Codified Laws § 43-28-19 (recitals are prima facia evidence on questions of marital status, homestead and identity when recorded); N.D. Title Standards 2-03 (permits reliance upon a recitation of single status, including widow or widower, if no evidence of marriage appears in the record).
2Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-452; Ida. Code § 32-912; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13 (also applies to leases if the initial term, together with any option or extension, exceeds 5 years, or if the term is indefinite); and Rev. Code Wash. Ann. § 26.16.030(3). Under New Mexico law, for example, if a spouse fails to join in the conveyance, mortgage, assignment, or lease of community property, the instrument is void and of no effect, unless ratified by the spouse in writing. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13; Hannah v. Tennant, 589 P.2d 1035 (N.M. 1979). In fact, an instrument purporting to convey a community property interest that is signed by only one of the spouses may not even be effective as to the spouse who signed the instrument. Either the joining or non-joining spouse can subsequently assert a claim that the conveyance was void. See Marquez v. Marquez, 513 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1973); McGrail v. Fields, 203 P.2d 1000 (N.M. 1949).
3Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-20-101 et seq.
4Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-101 et seq.
5Utah Code Ann. § 75-2b-101 et seq.
6Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-720 et seq.
7The statutes list rebuttable presumptions relating to community property and separate property.
8Mont. Code Ann. § 70-32-105.
9Nev. Rev. Stat. § 115.020.
10S.D. Codified Laws § 43-31-8.
11Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-504.
12See Mont. Code Ann. § 70-32-301; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 115.040; S.D. Codified Laws § 43-31-17; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-504(4).
13Neb. Rev. Stat. § 40-104.
14N.M. Stat. Ann. § 42-10-9.
15While N.D. Cent. Code §§ 47-18-19 through 20 provide for execution and recording of a homestead declaration, N.D. Cent. Code § 47-18-17 provides that failure to make such a declaration shall not impair the homestead right.
16Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-121 (in addition to spousal joinder, requires language stating: “Hereby releasing and waiving all rights under and by virtue of the homestead exemption laws of this state” to convey or encumber homestead). Under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-8-101 et seq., a defective deed is cured by operation of law after it has been of record for 10 years, however. 17Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-41-202.
18As noted above, homesteads created automatically in Colorado are the exception since the record owner alone can convey or encumber the property.
19Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-201 et seq.
20Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-222.
21Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-2313 – 2314 (period extended to 3 years).
22N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-05-01.
23Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201 et seq.

The Granting Clause: The Gift That Keeps on Granting

Fee Lease 101 Series, Lease Provisions, Title Issues/Curative,

The granting clause of a lease contains the required words of grant that create an interest in the lessee.1 This clause is typically found at the beginning of the lease and is often overlooked when drafting a lease, to the detriment of the lessee. The granting clause generally covers three main topics: (i) the leased substances; (ii) the associated easement rights; and (iii) the property description.

Leased substances

The granting clause should include a careful description of the substances covered by the lease. Typical granting clauses include language such as “oil, gas, and other minerals,”2 “oil and all gas of whatsoever nature or kind,”3 or some variation of these simplistic descriptions. Even though this language may, at first glance, seem uncontroversial, the failure to adequately list the substances covered by the lease has led to a multitude of lawsuits.

For example, the failure to adequately define the leased substances can lead to questions whether the lease covers coalbed methane, which depending on the state, may not be included in a general grant of gas. Another problem is encountered when interpreting what is included in the “other minerals” under a lease. The parties to a lease should not rely on a court to dictate what substances are covered by that lease.

As a practical matter, the goal in drafting the leased substances portion of the granting clause is to ensure that the lease covers all substances that are necessary to produce the oil and gas from the leasehold. Any special substances that may be encountered, such as coalbed methane, helium, carbon dioxide, hydrogen, or sulfur, should be individually listed in the lease. By including a list of known or expected substances, together with catch-all language to cover substances that may not yet be known or expected in the field, the lessee can avoid unfavorable interpretations by a court that could render the lease unprofitable or unusable.

Associated Easement Rights

The second part of the granting clause is the description of the easement granted to the lessee. Historically, the grant of an easement and the right to conduct surface operations has been broadly, if not vaguely, described in the lease. The lessee has, instead, relied on the implied right of access to the surface estate arising from the mineral estate’s dominance. Reliance on this implied right of access can be problematic when the surface owner engages in activities that prevent or inhibit oil and gas development or when the surface owner disagrees with and challenges the lessee’s use of the surface estate.

As for split estate lands, the lessee should be careful to ensure that the lease does not grant and that the lessee does not rely on a right of access that was not reserved or conveyed in the deed creating the split estate. Keep in mind that the lessor can only grant the rights that the lessor owns.

To avoid these issues, I recommend that this portion of the granting clause describe the specific activities that the lessee will be conducting on the leased premises, such as construction and location of the various production facilities, powerlines, roads, pipelines, and any other activity that may foreseeably be required to produce the oil and gas. By describing the specific activities, the surface owner is put on notice of the types of activities that the lessee is planning to conduct on the surface estate. If a lawsuit ensues, it will be very difficult if not impossible for the surface owner to argue that they were unaware that the surface would be used for these activities.

I note also that, even though the lessee, through careful drafting of the lease, may be able to secure surface access for gathering facilities and other surface disturbance activities not related to production of oil and gas from the leasehold, this grant of access could be terminated upon expiration of the lease term. For such activities, I recommend that the lessor obtain a separate surface use agreement specifically granting the right to conduct these activities to ensure that they survive termination of the lease.

The Leased Premises

Finally, the granting clause should include a description of the land covered by the lease. This should, of course, include a legal description of the property together with the acreage covered by the leasehold. For small or irregular tracts of land, the lease should include a Mother Hubbard clause4 to ensure that inadequately described property that is adjacent to and contiguous with the leasehold will be covered by the lease.

In the event that the lease is limited in depth, the property description should include language that identifies the specific interval covered by the lease, making sure that the depth description is tied to a measured depth in a specific well. A carefully crafted depth description will avoid confusion as to the actual depth covered by the lease.

Other Considerations

A common, but surprising, issue is that some granting clauses fail to include present words of grant. That is, the granting clause describes the activities that can be undertaken on the leasehold but does not expressly grant the rights to the underlying oil and gas.5

Another issue that you should be aware of is that, with horizontal drilling resulting in ever increasingly long laterals, the easement in the granting clause should include language granting the lessee a subsurface easement to accommodate horizontal development. Again, if this subsurface easement will be used for the benefit of lands located outside the leasehold, the subsurface easement should be created by a separate agreement between the parties, thereby preventing the easement from terminating with the underlying lease. Also, for a lease limited by depth, the granting language should include a subsurface easement for all depths that must be traversed in order to access the leased interval.

In summary, through careful drafting of the various components of the granting clause, the lessee can protect itself from unexpected complications and ensure that it is allowed to fully develop and produce the oil and gas resource.

1Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Myers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 497 (12th ed. 2003).
2David E. Pierce, Incorporating a Century of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence Into the “Modern” Oil and Gas Lease, 33 Washburn L. J. 786 (1994).
3Martin & Kramer.
4A clause commonly included in contemporary leases to meet the problem of adequately describing strips of land owned by a lessor contiguous to the land specifically described by the lease and intended to be covered by the lease. Id. at 246. Also known as a cover-all clause or an all-inclusive clause.
5Pierce.

Beyond Six Feet Under: Mineral Ownership and Development Issues Involving Cemeteries

Title Issues/Curative, ,

Recent news coverage has spurred discussion on the rights that burial plot owners have in cemeteries and whether or not drilling for oil and gas should be prohibited on or under lands reserved for the dead.1 As horizontal drilling brings oil and gas development closer to population centers, the oil and gas industry will need to address some of the unique title and public policy issues surrounding mineral development under cemeteries.

Often, individual burial plot deeds read like warranty deeds and do not contain mineral reservations. However, burial plot deeds may contain a qualifier that the deed is granted for the sole purpose of the burial of human remains. If a burial plot deed grants fee title and contains no mineral reservations, it is conceivable that the burial plot owner (or his or her estate) could attempt to make a claim to the minerals underneath. Under general rules of deed interpretation in most states, a deed with no mineral reservations is deemed to convey fee title, including mineral rights.

On the other hand, burial plot transactions are not typical real property transactions. It is arguable that burial plot deeds are not intended to grant fee simple title to the land. The general rule is that “one who owns or has an interest in a cemetery for burial purposes does not acquire any title to the soil, but only an easement or license for the use intended.”2 Case law suggests that a burial plot deed should be interpreted as conveying only such interests in the burial plot that are necessary for the purpose of burying human remains (in other words not mineral rights). However, it is not clear that this rule applies in each state.3 From a public policy standpoint, it could be very difficult to track down the heirs or devisees of burial plot owners who died centuries ago.

If burial plot owners do not have a valid mineral claim, then who does? Public entities, common-law dedicators, and cemetery operators are likely candidates. For example, if a parcel of land is owned in fee simple by a public entity and dedicated for a cemetery, then the public entity (such as the city) would own the fee title, including mineral rights. If a parcel of land is privately owned in fee simple and dedicated on a subdivision plat or conveyed as a common-law dedication for use as a cemetery, then arguably the mineral title remains with the dedicator.4 If a cemetery operator acquired fee simple title, including minerals, by conveyance, then the operator may be deemed to own the minerals after deeding out the burial plots under the general rule discussed above.

Although the value of mineral rights under individual burial plots are likely to be economically miniscule, particularly if a cemetery is contained within a large drilling and spacing unit, there are risks involved if the proper mineral owners are not identified. Unfortunately, because of the small amount of oil and gas development near cemeteries to date, there are very few states that have addressed issues of mineral title in cemeteries. Therefore, title examiners and land departments should carefully examine burial plot deeds and thoroughly analyze the applicable state’s law in order to determine the correct mineral ownership under cemeteries.

Knowing who owns the minerals is only part of the issue if an operator intends to drill within the boundaries of a cemetery. Conducting drilling operations on actual cemetery land will likely be against public policy in many states. For example, inChas. E. Knox Oil Co. v. McKee, a church signed a lease with the operator for the purpose of drilling for oil and gas.5 Some of the church congregation members had family members buried in the cemetery and filed an injunction against the operator. The court held that it was against public policy to permit an operator to drill for oil and gas in a cemetery.6

Today with technological advancements in horizontal drilling, operators now have the ability to drill for minerals underneath cemeteries without having to conduct surface activities on the surface of the cemeteries. Arguably, the public policy rule established in cases like McKee would not apply to horizontal drilling. However, there have been recent oil and gas opposition groups claiming that underground fracking would disturb gravesites and not allow the dead to effectively “rest in peace.”7 Although mineral extraction occurs at depths that would likely never have any impact on gravesites, operators should be prepared to discuss and address these concerns when electing to drill for minerals on or beneath cemeteries.

*The author would like to acknowledge Scott T. Swallow for his contribution to this article.
1Manny Fernandez, Drilling for Gas Under Cemeteries Raises Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/drilling-for-natural-gas-under-cemeteries-raises-concerns.html; see also Julie Carr Smyth, PRESSCONNECTS, Gas Drilling under Cemeteries Raises Money, Moral Questions, July 3, 2012, http://archive.pressconnects.com/article/20120704/NEWS01/207040337/Gas-drilling-under-cemeteries-raises-money-moral-questions.
2Walker v. Georgia Power Co., 177 Ga. App. 493, 496 (1986); see also Heiligman v. Chambers, 338 P.2d 144, 148 (Okla. 1959); Evergreen-Washelli Memorial Park Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 574 P.2d 735 (Wash. 1978); Petition of First Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church in City of Pittsburg, 251 A.2d 685 (Pa. 1969).
3See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-8-102; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-12-116 (2006).
4See Taylor v. Con’t S. Corp., 280 P.2d 514 (Cal. App. 2d 1955).
5Chas. E. Knox Oil Co. v. McKee, 223 P. 880 (Okla. 1924).
6Id. at 882.
7See infra note 1.

How Online Genealogical Tools Can Make a Landman’s Life Easier

Title Issues/Curative, , ,

The drilling rig is en route to your location and your land manager is breathing down your neck to lease the last remaining fee owners. The only problem: the owners cannot be found because they are likely deceased. Now what do you do? Carry the interests? Force pool? Drilling delays can be costly and carrying interests can be risky, so time is of the essence. Fortunately, there are a number of online genealogical tools available that might help you track down the heirs or devisees of the deceased owners.

Surprisingly, Google searches are a great starting point. In particular, rare names or unique spellings are helpful to locate information and, oftentimes, an obituary can be located by searching a decedent’s name and last known city or state of residence. Obituaries are generally accurate and provide a list of possible heirs or devisees. If an obituary is not located by a Google search, it might be found using another search engine, such as Yahoo or Bing.

If you know the decedent’s place of death and approximate date of death, you can search probate records. Some states, such as Colorado1, Montana2, New Mexico3, North Dakota4, Texas5, and Utah6, have websites which provide probate or other genealogical resources online. Individual counties typically maintain their own probate files. Where resources are not available online, you may ask the county court if there is a probate file for the decedent and, if so, request a copy of the file.

What about the more difficult searches? GenealogyBank.com, a subscription-based site, has a database of 6,500 newspapers with some newspapers going as far back as 1690. Generally, the earlier the date of death, the more difficult it is to find an obituary for the decedent. However, GenealogyBank.com may provide a death notice (indicating when and where the decedent died), a social security number, newsworthy stories, or birth or marriage announcements. If a social security number is located, it can be used to search the Social Security Death Index (free on several online genealogical websites, see below) to identify the date of the decedent’s birth and death, the town in which the decedent’s social security card was issued, and the decedent’s last place of residence. Any information gathered about the decedent, including relatives, dates of life events, places of life events, etc., can be used on other genealogical websites to locate potential heirs or devisees.

Obituaries and genealogical information may also be available on FindAGrave.com. However, this website is best known for its vast library of headstone images. These images generally include the name of the decedent’s spouse and the decedent’s and his or her spouse’s birth and death dates (as well as the location where the decedent was buried).

The largest of all the genealogical websites is Ancestry.com, which claims to have over 6 billion records available online. Another genealogical website, FamilySearch.org, is particularly helpful for decedents who resided in Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming. There are countless other genealogical blogs and websites to search, many of which focus on a particularly feature such as religion, national origin, ethnic background, etc. The larger genealogical websites, including Ancestry.com and FamilySearch.org, have census records available up until 1940.7 These websites also include marriage records, birth records, military records, and family trees. Family trees are created by individuals, which means they are not always accurate or complete. However, they are a great source for locating possible heirs or devisees because they may include names of descendants, biographies, and family histories. As an added feature, some websites allow communication with the person who provided the genealogical information to the website.

The more information that you can use in a search, the better the chance that: (i) you will find the decedent’s heirs or devisees and (ii) they will be the right persons. With any luck, you will gather enough information to track down possible heirs or devisees to obtain leases or send participation letters prior to drilling. Although these online genealogical resources may not finish the job, since title curative will likely be required, they can start you down the right path.

1https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/archives/archives-search.
2http://www.montana-genealogy.com/Montana-Probate-Records.htm. No subscription required, but the website links to third-party subscription websites.
3http://caselookup.nmcourts.gov/.
4http://publicsearch.ndcourts.gov/.
5http://www.texas.gov/en/discover/Pages/topic.aspx?topicid=/records. Records available for select counties only.
6http://www.utcourts.gov/xchange. Subscription required.
7Census records are sealed for 72 years after the census is taken, which means they are currently available for the 1940s and back.

Potential Pitfalls of Continuous Drilling Provisions in HBP Fee Leases

Fee Lease 101 Series, Lease Provisions,

A common but often overlooked oil and gas lease provision is the “continuous drilling” or “continuous operations” provision. Generally, a continuous drilling provision allows a temporary cessation of production without automatically resulting in the termination of an oil and gas lease that has been extended by production. In order to qualify for the temporary cessation, certain operations (as defined in the lease or by case law) must be commenced on the leased premises or lands pooled or unitized therewith within a specified time period (typically from 30 to 120 days). Two examples are as follows:

If, at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, oil or gas is not being produced on the leased premises or on acreage pooled therewith but Lessee is then engaged in drilling or reworking operations thereon, then this lease shall continue in force so long as operations are being continually prosecuted on the leased premises or on acreage pooled therewith; and operations shall be considered to be continuously prosecuted if not more than ninety (90) days shall elapse between the completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of a subsequent well.

If, at the expiration of the primary term, oil or gas is not being produced on said land, but lessee is then engaged in drilling or reworking operations thereon, the lease shall remain in force so long as operations are prosecuted with no cessation of more than 30 consecutive days.

Continuous drilling provisions are of particular importance when analyzing older, HBP leases. Specifically, a number of situations should be considered. Has your lease produced each and every month since the expiration of the primary term? Have you or your predecessor ceased production to rework the well or recomplete in a new formation? Have severe weather conditions caused a temporary cessation of production? Each of these situations could potentially lead to a finding that your lease has expired.

Oil and gas wells generally do not have perfect production histories. Williams & Meyers states: “Since repairs, breakdowns, and reworking operations are incidental to the normal operation of a lease, the parties must have contemplated that the temporary cessation of production caused by such events would not result in automatic termination of the lease.”1 Based upon this implied understanding, if an oil and gas lease does not contain a continuous drilling provision, the lessee may extend the lease by exercising reasonable diligence in the continuance of its operations on the leased premises. In other words, courts have held that a temporary cessation of production is allowed where no specific deadline is provided.2 What is temporary? There is no hard and fast rule. An Arkansas court found a temporary cessation where a fire destroyed a producing well and production was not resumed for four years.3 However, whether a cessation of production is temporary is a question of fact that will depend on the individual circumstances.4 Although the individual facts may vary, courts typically weigh the following factors: failure of the lessor for a substantial period of time to claim forfeiture during which time the lessee was engaged in activities on the lease, absence of drainage, intent of lessee to hold the lease, and diligence of the lessee in seeking to find a market or to resume production.5 Due to the fact-intensive nature of the analysis, each circumstance must be carefully reviewed under the applicable case law in that state.

The continuous drilling provision was created in order to provide more certainty in the face of inconsistent court rulings. While providing the parties with a more reliable test, a continuous drilling provision could prove fatal to an HBP lease. According to Williams & Meyers: “Where there are express savings provisions in a lease that specify dates [i.e., 30-120 days] by which the lessee must take certain action or the lease will terminate, the temporary cessation of production doctrine will not apply so as to extend the lease beyond those specified time limits.”6 Unlike the analysis above, the specific time periods by which a lessee must recommence operations are hard and fast.7 Absent some other lease provision, mechanical issues with the well, lack of a market, or any other delay in production could cause a lease to be deemed expired in as few as 30 days without production. Therefore, careful attention should be made to the production (and operations) history on the leased premises to ensure any continuous drilling provision has been strictly observed.

Despite a constant push for greater efficiencies in acquisition due diligence and title opinions, a thorough HBP analysis should not be forgotten. Such analysis may require obtaining well records back to the date of first production, reviewing the complete well file, and investigating the cause of any delays in production.

For More Information Contact:
David B. Hatch
Phone: 801-799-5834
Email: dbhatch@hollandhart.com

1Williams & Meyers, “Oil and Gas Law” § 604.4.
2Id.
3Saulsberry v. Siegel, 252 S.W.2d 834 (Ark. 1952).
4See Watson v. Rochmill, 155 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. 1941).
5Williams & Meyers, § 604.4 at fn. 11; see, e.g., Somont Oil Co. v. A & G Drilling, Inc., 49 P.3d 598 (Mont. 2002) (finding the intent and diligence of the operator in restoring production is a factor in determining with a cessation of production is temporary).
6Williams & Meyers, § 604.4.
7See, e.g., Greer v. Salmon, 479 P.2d 294 (N.M. 1970) (finding that where the lessee didn’t strictly comply with the 90-day cessation clause the lease terminated).

The Implied Covenant to Drill and Develop in Montana

Royalty Issues, , ,

In Montana, there are many older oil and gas leases held by production, particularly in eastern Montana. These leases often times cover several tracts of land and do not contain a Pugh Clause. Although one or more of the tracts of the lease may be part of a producing unit, other tracts are not. Because there is no Pugh Clause in the lease, there is no explicit contractual right to a release of the nonproducing tracts. Given the recent development of the Bakken, the fact that a mineral owner may have nonproducing tracts of land held by an older lease with unfavorable royalty provisions is an undesirable situation for the owner. Mineral owners are, therefore, turning towards common law and unique mechanisms under Montana law to gain releases of these lands.

According to Montana Code Annotated Section 82-1-201, when an executed and recorded oil or gas lease is forfeited, cancelled, or expires, the lessee is required to have the lease released from record in the county where the leased land is situated within 60 days from the forfeiture. If the lessor sends a written notice requesting a release and the lessee fails to record the release within 30 days of the notice, then the lessee is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $250.1 Additionally, if, “by its terms,” an oil or gas lease has expired and is subject to forfeiture for nonperformance andmore than 3 years have elapsed since expiration, the mineral owner may serve written notice on the lessee pursuant to Section 82-1-202(2) demanding a release. The notice must inform the lessee that unless it files an affidavit stating that the lease is in effect within 60 days of the date of service of the notice, the lease must be terminated and is of no effect.2 After this 60-day period has expired, the mineral owner may file an affidavit of service of the notice in the county clerk’s office and from the filing of this notice the lands are released from the lien of the lease.3

Mineral rights owners have been increasingly using these statutes to demand partial releases of oil and gas leases pursuant to the implied covenant to drill and develop in Montana. Many times, the owners will send notice pursuant to Section 82-1-202(2) asserting that a lease has been expired for more than three years as to a tract or tracts of land because the lessee has failed to develop these tracts. The mineral owners cannot demand a release under an express provision of the lease because another tract in the lease is part of a producing unit and there is no Pugh Clause. Thus, the lease is technically held by production. Mineral owners, therefore, have turned to the implied covenant to drill and develop in order to gain releases of nonproducing tracts. If a lessee fails to respond to this notice because it believes the mineral owner had no right to send it, then the mineral owner proceeds to record an affidavit of service pursuant to Section 82-1-202(4) asserting that the lands are released. Whether the affidavit actually does release the lands may hinge on whether the owner had the right to demand a release as to certain tracts of land pursuant to the implied covenant to drill and develop.

Forfeitures of oil and gas leases are favored by the law and will be strictly enforced in Montana.4 In Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., mineral owners brought an action based partially upon a breach of an implied covenant to reasonably and prudently develop the leasehold.5 The Montana Supreme Court analyzed this covenant, but refused to consider it beyond the terms of the lease.6 The Court specifically found that pursuant to two express provisions in the lease, the operator had a duty to explore for or produce oil and gas from the leasehold.7 If the producer failed, the terms of the lease allowed the lessors to terminate the lease.8 The operator also had the option to make delay rentals, which it did.9 The acceptance of these delay rentals excused the lessee from fulfilling the duty to develop the leasehold.10 The Court specifically stated that it “will not look beyond these express provisions in order to impose a duty upon [the lessee] which is in contravention of their terms.”11

In Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., the Court considered the implied covenant to produce and market gas and noted that “if a lease is terminated by the breach of implied covenants, it is forfeited.”12 Although neither Sundheim nor Bertheloteanalyzed whether an oil and gas lease should be partially released based upon the implied covenant to drill and develop the leasehold, both cases appear to lay the groundwork for such a claim. However, when analyzing a Pugh Clause in a lease, the Court has noted that absent a Pugh Clause “the lease would remain in effect as to the entire leased premises.”13 Given this statement by the Court and the Court’s reluctance in Sundheim to look beyond the express provisions of a lease to impose a duty which is in contravention of the lease terms, there is a good argument that a court will not impose an implied duty to develop a lease which is already held by production, even if certain tracts are not part of a producing unit. Unless there is an express provision (Pugh Clause) in the lease requiring the lessee to develop every tract or risk forfeiture, it is unlikely that a Montana court will afford a remedy based upon this implied covenant.

However, it is still important that a lessee not ignore a demand sent pursuant to Section 82-1-202. According to the statute, if a lessee fails to respond to this notice, then the mineral owner can record an affidavit of service pursuant to Section 82-1-202(4) and the lands are released. If a lessee does not timely response and the lessor files an affidavit of service, the lessee may be left trying to figure out how to make it clear in the county records that the lease has not in fact been released. Thus, it is best to consult with an attorney immediately upon receipt of such a notice if the lessee believes that the tracts are not subject to forfeiture.

1Mont. Code Ann. § 82-1-201(3). 
2Mont. Code Ann. § 82-1-202(2). 
3Mont. Code Ann. § 82-1-202(4).
4Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen, 100 F.2d 299, 300–01 (Mont. 1938). 
5Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503 (1991).
6Id. at 509–10.
7Id. at 509. 
8Id. 
9Id. at 509–10. 
10Id. 
11Id. at 510.
12Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 28 P.2d 187, 190 (Mont. 1933).
13Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Texaco Inc., 820 P.2d 1269, 1272 (Mont. 1991).